In the Matter Of:

LEONARD NORMAN COHEN vs. KELLEY LYNCH

MOTION/ SANCTION/ PLTF. HEARING

October 06, 2015

Court Reporters, Videography, Trial Preparation

Videoconference Center

Oakland • San Francisco • San Jose • Los Angeles

877.451.1580

www.aikenwelch.com



1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	LEONARD NORMAN COHEN,)
4	Plaintiff,) SUPERIOR COURT
5	vs.) CASE NO. BC338322
6	KELLEY LYNCH,
7	Defendant.)
8	 /
9	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. HESS
11	111 NORTH HILL STREET, DEPARTMENT 24
12	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012
13	TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2015
14	APPEARANCES:
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KORY & RICE, LLP BY: MICHELLE L. RICE, ESQ.
16	9300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200 Beverly Hills, California 90212
17	Telephone: (310) 285-1633 email: mrice@koryrice.com
18	
19	KORY & RICE, LLP BY: ROBERT B. KORY, ESQ.
20	9300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200 Beverly Hills, California 90212
21	Telephone: (310) 285-1631 email: rkory@koryrice.com
22	
23	PRESENT:
24	Kelly Lynch, Defendant pro per
25	
26	REPORTED BY: Nancy Jo Hutch, CSR No. 13732, Official Court Reporter Pro Tempore
27	
28	

1 (Proceedings commenced at 9:46 a.m.) 2 THE COURT: Cohen vs. Lynch, please. MS. RICE: Good morning. Michelle Rice for the 3 plaintiffs, Leonard Cohen and Leonard Cohen Investments. 4 This is my law partner, Robert Kory. 5 6 MS. LYNCH: Kelley Lynch, for myself. THE COURT: All right. Have a seat, please. 7 8 We have three separate motions here. We have Ms. Lynch's motion to set aside renewal of the judgment, 9 which was entered or July 13, 2015; and as I understand 10 11 it, that the motion, essentially, restates the various 12 arguments that were made in 2013 by Ms. Lynch also in pro 13 per in a motion to vacate and/or modify the default 14 judgment. That was heard on January 17, 2014 and was 15 denied on the merits. Then there was a motion by Ms. Lynch filed March 17, 16 2015 for terminating sanctions and other sanctions, which 17 18 the Court heard on June 22, 2015, and that reiterated the claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Lynch, 19 20 that both of those -- that was also denied. And it's my 21 understanding notices of appeal have been filed on both of 22 It appears to me that this is an attempt to have a 23 third bite of that same apple. MS. LYNCH: What is? 24 25 THE COURT: Your motion to set aside a renewal 26 of judgment to the extent that it is based on the alleged 27 impropriety of the original judgment. This is -- you

28

know, you've lost twice already on this, and this is a

```
1
    third bite, isn't it?
               MS. LYNCH: It's not a third bite, Your Honor.
 2
 3
    All right. I wasn't served this lawsuit.
               THE COURT: I know.
 4
               MS. LYNCH: So that's just a fact. It's not
 5
 6
    going to change.
 7
               THE COURT: Ma'am, you have -- the proof of
8
    service does not allege that you were personally served.
    It alleges sub service.
9
10
               MS. LYNCH: No, I'm sorry.
                                           The plaintiffs have
11
    never argued that someone else was served, and they
12
     submitted --
13
               THE COURT: I beg your pardon, ma'am.
14
     seen --
               MS. LYNCH: They submitted a photograph of
15
    myself, Judge Hess.
16
17
               THE COURT: Ma'am, I have seen the proof of
18
    service.
19
               MS. LYNCH: What I'm saying is, plaintiffs have
20
    even gone so far as to submit a photograph of me in an
21
    attempt to prove that I was served.
22
               THE COURT: The proof of service on which the
23
    default and the default judgment were entered --
24
               MS. LYNCH: Right.
25
               THE COURT: -- was sub service.
26
               MS. LYNCH: I understand that.
27
               THE COURT: Okay. And every time you say, well,
28
    I was not personally served, it's off the point. You
```

```
1
    don't have to be personally served if I am persuaded that
    valid sub service was made, and I am so persuaded and have
 2
 3
    been.
               MS. LYNCH: Well, there was no female
 4
     co-occupant, so it would be very difficult for you to be
 5
 6
    persuaded since no such individual exists.
 7
               THE COURT: This is exactly the same argument
8
    you've made to me twice before.
9
               MS. LYNCH: Judge Hess, may I say one thing?
10
               THE COURT: If you can do it in a respectful
11
    manner and not continually interrupting me and not in the
12
    hostile and aggressive tone that you're using.
13
               MS. LYNCH:
                           I don't like being called a liar, to
14
    be frank with you.
15
               THE COURT: Did I do that?
               MS. LYNCH: Essentially, you are. Yes, I feel
16
17
     that way.
18
               THE COURT: In what --
19
               MS. LYNCH: By telling me that someone was
20
    served at my home. This is not true.
21
               THE COURT: You claim you weren't there.
               MS. LYNCH:
22
                           I don't claim I wasn't at my home.
23
    I claim I was home at all times. I didn't have a car, and
    I was home. I also claim, and Paulette Brandt was in
24
25
     court to testify that she was present. My son, Rutger,
26
    was there and our male co-occupant Chad Knaak -- whose
27
    room, I might add, was directly off the front door -- was
```

28

present. We were all there. No one was served.

1 THE COURT: Ma'am, that is exactly the same argument you have made to me twice before, and this is the 2 third occasion on which you've done it. 3 MS. LYNCH: This is not an argument. 4 These are facts, and this is reality. It's not an argument, Judge 5 6 Hess. I'm sorry. It's an actual fact. No one came to 7 the house, and no one was served. So that's not an 8 argument. That's just basic facts of the matter. It's 9 not going to change. I mean, should I begin lying about it or something? 10 11 THE COURT: You have also got a motion to tax, 12 reduce, or strike costs. I was trying to understand why 13 you thought this could be made. 14 A motion to tax costs is to be made very promptly, and 15 the -- when the bill of costs is submitted. Do I understand that this is really a challenge to 16 17 post-judgment accrued interest since the original judgment 18 was entered on May 15, 2006? 19 MS. LYNCH: Is it what? 20 THE COURT: Is your motion to tax, reduce or 21 strike costs actually directed to post-judgment interest 22 that has accrued on the May 15, 2006 default judgment? 23 MS. LYNCH: It's directed at fraudulent 24 financial interests, yes. 25 THE COURT: I don't know what that means. Would 26 you care to explain what that means? 27 MS. LYNCH: When someone is attempting to extort

28

something from another human being that they're not

1 entitled to; and on top of that, add interest. fraudulent financial interest. 2 3 THE COURT: Do I take that as a yes? Is that a 4 yes to my question? MS. LYNCH: Yes. It's a yes to your question. 5 THE COURT: And why is it appropriate under the 6 Code of Civil Procedure Section 685.070? 7 8 MS. LYNCH: Well, they're not entitled to any of 9 these mouths. I didn't misappropriate anything, for 10 number one, so it seems illegal. And also, I'd like to 11 say that these corporations are suspended, and they are 12 part of this motion to tax costs because they are part of 13 the underlying judgment. 14 THE COURT: Who is they? 15 MS. LYNCH: The corporation. THE COURT: What corporation? 16 17 MS. LYNCH: Two corporations. 18 THE COURT: Excuse me. What corporation is part 19 of the motion to tax costs? This is your motion. 20 MS. LYNCH: The corporations are part of the 21 judgment and part of the renewal of judgment. 22 THE COURT: So? 23 MS. LYNCH: Well, they're suspended. And they 24 were, actually, when the judgment was entered, and Kory & 25 Rice are well aware of that fact. It's even in the 26 complaint. And it's my understanding that you cannot 27 transfer any type of property of a corporation. I just 28 spoke to the secretary of state's office about it during

1 suspension, and these entities have not been revived. they are actually part of the motion to tax costs because 2 they're the basis of it. 3 THE COURT: Why is your motion -- let's assume 4 that it's directed to renewal of judgment. Why is the 5 motion timely under California Rule of Court 3.1700? 6 MS. LYNCH: What do you mean by time line? 7 8 THE COURT: I beg your pardon? MS. LYNCH: Was this the one that had to be more 9 10 than ten days? 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MS. LYNCH: There was a problem here in that I 13 was served in two different manners. One was by mail, 14 which allows it to be served, filed within 18 days. Isn't 15 that correct? THE COURT: Actually, you cite to Rule 3.1700, 16 Subdivision B, which provides 15 days to file a motion to 17 18 tax costs. That relates to prejudgment costs and not post 19 judgment costs. 20 MS. LYNCH: Then I suppose it's just confusion. 21 THE COURT: Okay. With respect to her two motions, plaintiff, is there anything that you wish to 22 23 say? MS. RICE: Well, I mean, with respect to the 24 25 corporations that are in bad standing, as we said in our 26 opposition papers, there was a constructive trust that was 27 awarded as part of the default judgment which, you know,

28

our argument is that it's irrelevant, that these

corporations were in bad standing because the gravamen of the complaint against the codefendant, Richard Westin, is that he had set up the corporations and they were not formed properly. And he did not maintain the corporations in good standing. And so there is a separate defendant here that, you know, was responsible for setting up these corporations. And so Mr. Cohen was awarded, as part of the default judgment of constructive trust, which the Court exercised its equitable jurisdiction in. You know, the assets were sort of out there. You know, Ms. Lynch's argument they were in bad standing, it's our position that it's irrelevant because of the constructive trust remedy that was awarded as part of the default judgment.

MS. LYNCH: Cannot be irrelevant if two corporations and their assets are transferred via any kind of vehicle because their assets cannot be transferred.

MS. RICE: If I also may address that point,
Your Honor. There is a District of Colorado litigation
that Ms. Lynch was also a defendant of in Colorado that
occurred. It was 2005 to 2008, and the investment adviser
was actually in possession of the remainder of the funds.
They were the custodian of the remainder of the funds in
Traditional Holdings LLC. They had inconsistent claims
between Ms. Lynch and Mr. Cohen, and so they interpleaded
the remainder of the \$154,000 of funds into the court's
registry, the district court there. The judge actually
ruled Ms. Lynch failed to make an appearance in that case.

MS. LYNCH: No. That's not correct.

THE COURT: Don't interrupt.

MS. RICE: So Ms. Lynch was a defendant also in that case, and she was also served in that case. And she wrote to District Judge Babcock saying she refused to participate in tax fraud, but the judge there ruled that Mr. Cohen was the owner of the remainder of the funds in Traditional Holdings.

And so Ms. Lynch points that these entities had to be named as parties, or they had to be in good standing. Traditional Holdings was also not a party to the District of Colorado litigation, and Ms. Lynch is well aware of that. That judgment was entered in September of 2008. It was not appealed by Ms. Lynch, and so she's now attempting to make -- assert some type of claim to the Traditional Holdings which, that matter, it seems to me, the judgment in Colorado District, the court would block or bar Ms. Lynch's claims to Traditional Holdings in this proceeding as well. I mean -- so it's sort of a collateral estoppel, res judicata idea where she sat on her rights in Colorado and didn't object to the interpleader action.

And I was the attorney of record in that case for Mr. Cohen, and the judge ordered summary judgment to Mr. Cohen for Traditional Holdings. So again, I mean, to the extent Ms. Lynch is arguing Traditional Holdings is in bad standing, it's irrelevant to this proceeding because that's already been decided in the District of Colorado.

MS. LYNCH: May I say something, Judge Hess?
THE COURT: Yes.

28 THE COURT:

MS. LYNCH: Judge Babcock relied on the order here, on the judgment here, which transfers the real property, tangible property of Traditional Holdings and Blue Mist Touring to Leonard Cohen. So the Colorado order is based on this case.

Furthermore, Judge Hess, this is a very bizarre matter because what Leonard Cohen and his attorneys are not saying is that somehow they've managed to leave standing federal tax returns where I am named as a partner.

However, I wasn't a partner. I'm not really sure I understand any of their argument. So there are -- my point being, outstanding matters with respect to

Traditional Holdings, they're federal matters because they transferred these properties back to Leonard Cohen but didn't -- but left me on federal tax returns as a partner having paid taxes. So there are outstanding issues, is my point, and assets of these suspended corporations for transfer while they were suspended.

THE COURT: All right. The motion for -- to set aside the renewal of the judgment is denied. The motion for an order to tax, reduce, or strike costs is also denied.

Now, I also have Mr. Cohen's motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure 128.7. And as I understand it, you are seeking nonmonetary sanctions to fund this motion in various forms.

MS. RICE: Correct.

THE COURT: And I am trying to understand why

the sanctions that you seek are appropriate under 128.7.

MS. RICE: Well, Your Honor, 128.7 B1 says that the signature of a paper in a proceeding is not being interposed for purposes of harassment, and that's the B1 prong. And Ms. Lynch filed, after filing a motion to vacate in August of 2013 on the basis of a false proof of service, which was denied in January of 2014. She waited 14 months to come back and filed this. She filed eleven hundred pages in a motion for terminating sanctions, and she alleged that Mr. Cohen had committed all kinds of tax fraud, that he had stolen from his previous advisers; all sorts of extraneous type of matters that were meant to harass the plaintiff.

She accused my law partner and myself of perjury in our declarations. She -- you know, conclusory allegations, basically, that were not really supported by the record. And so it's our, you know, I mean, basically -- she also did not even do the minimal research in terms of the legal standing of her motion because she actually sought terminating sanctions which, at the procedural posture of this case -- you know, this is a final judgment, and terminating sanctions were just not appropriate. And she didn't cite any case authority that supported that. She actually cited inapposite federal cases under 60B, which are totally inapposite.

So, basically, she came back while claiming that she had not been served. It's our sort of feeling that this motion here was where she waived her personal

jurisdiction. I mean, she basically made a general appearance with this second motion here under the California authorities because she was seeking terminating sanctions of the underlying complaint, which would be a dismissal on the merits of the complaint.

And so we said, in our opposition, that under California authority, to preserve your jurisdictional objection after a default, you cannot come back and seek affirmative relief from the court and at the same time preserve your jurisdictional objections. So it was legally frivolous, which is the B2 prong under 128.7. And, you know, it also sort of hits the 128.7B, which is factually frivolous because Ms. Lynch was making wholly conclusory allegations that the plaintiff and the attorneys, Mr. Kory and myself, had committed perjury; that the default judgment was procured through fraud and that we had submitted fraudulent financial data to support the default judgment, which are wholly inapposite arguments of the stage where we are now because she's a default defendant.

And so, I mean, I think that any one of those would merit sanctions under 128.7. I mean, they don't have to be all of them, but I think the main point that we're trying to make, it's a 128.7B1, which is the purpose of the harassment. I mean, you don't come back with a motion for re-consideration that's eleven hundred pages' worth, and it caused us to have to hire another law firm to actually go through her filing here.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

And in her declaration, she actually -- she had 90 exhibits attached to her declaration, but 41 of which are attorney-client privileged communications between Mr. Cohen and his former attorneys, and even his current attorneys, and Ms. Lynch has also been subjected --

THE COURT: We have a sealing order, don't we?

MS. RICE: We do, Your Honor. Absolutely. We

do. That caused us to have to come in in May of this year

to seek ex-parte relief from the Court to actually seal

from the public view Mr. Cohen's attorney-client

privileged communications.

And if you look at the exhibits that she included with her terminating sanctions, she's hitting every single lawyer that Mr. Cohen has had for like the past 30 years attempting to sort of, you know, blow the attorney-client privilege, if you will. And so we had to come in on an ex-parte basis in May of this year to seek a sealing order for Your Honor to, your know, to keep from the public view. You know, I think it was like 41 of her 90 exhibits disclosed attorney-client privileged communications.

So that, in itself, is also the intentional disclosure in the public record in Mr. Cohen's attorney-client privileged communications. I think that, in and of itself, is sanctionable because Ms. Lynch, as Mr. Cohen's former business manager, did not hold the privilege with any of his advisers, and she has said so repeatedly in her declarations and filings in this court that she recognized that Mr. Westin, who is a codefendant with Ms. Lynch, was

Mr. Cohen's attorney. And yet you look at her exhibits that she included in her motion here, she's got all kinds of communications with Mr. Westin. So it's wholly inappropriate to have done that.

And then there's a second sort of reason. And we also filed to support our motion for sanctions of request for judicial notice. I don't know if you've had a chance to look at it.

THE COURT: I've seen it.

MS. RICE: You've seen it, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RICE: So there's two judgments. There's the judgment in the main case, which is BC338322, which was a default judgment that was entered May 15, 2006. There's a parallel case that were two tracks that Mr. Cohen's former attorneys, Gibson Dunn, proceeded down, and the main case is to seek, you know, monetary and the corporate interest, but then there was a separate judgment in the companion case, BC341120, which sought recovery of tangible personal property.

So when Ms. Lynch was terminated in October of 2004, she maintained Mr. Cohen's business records. Mr. Cohen had made several attempts to retrieve the personal property, the business correspondence, through Scott Edelman of Gibson Dunn in October of 2005, a year after Ms. Lynch's termination.

He sent her a letter requesting that within three days she return categories of business documents, which

included, you know, we're not -- it was not limited to attorney-client privileged documents or confidential information. It was a whole category of business communications that Mr. Cohen had had with his prior advisers. Ms. Lynch refused to return those to Scott Edelman, so he had to seek ex-parte relief in this court ten years ago. Mr. Cohen obtained a writ of possession, and we have provided the Court a copy of that in our request for judicial notice. And that is dated October 12, 2005.

THE COURT: I have that.

MS. RICE: And I would argue, and it's our position, that that order at 5G, which is Exhibit 5 of our request for judicial notice, at 5G there is a turnover order where it says defendant, Kelley A. Lynch, shall transfer possession of the property described in item 3C to the plaintiff. Notice to the defendant: Failure to comply with any order of the court in turnover possession of such property to plaintiff may subject you to being held in contempt of court. And so that was ten years ago.

Ms. Lynch was also -- there was a temporary restraining order that was issued as part of that ex-parte relief, and it also prevented Ms. Lynch from secreting, conveying, or sort of otherwise thwarting Mr. Cohen's efforts to retrieve the property from her residence. And so she's in violation of the temporary restraining order that prevented her from secreting or otherwise hiding or, you know -- and the categories of documents are listed.

They're pretty broad. So they would encompass the documents that she actually disclosed in the public record here in her March motion.

So you can imagine our surprise that we received this motion in March, and she is disclosing documents that she should no longer have possession of because she's in violation not only of the temporary restraining order, but also, I would argue, the writ of possession, which required Ms. Lynch to reconvey possession of any of the categories in item 3C of that writ of possession that are pretty broad, of plaintiff's personal property, including but not limited to, personal correspondence from 1960 to 1995; business correspondence from 1980 to 2004; personal financial records from 1980 to 2004, including tax returns, banks statements and other receipts of documents.

MS. LYNCH: The corporations are not in there.

THE COURT: Stop. Please don't interrupt. Go

MS. RICE: I was just saying, Your Honor, I think it's pretty clear that these categories are fairly broad in terms of business correspondence that Ms. Lynch would have in her possession through her employment as Mr. Cohen's former personal manager, and so then when we get this motion in March and we see that she's still in possession of correspondence with Mr. Cohen's advisers, I'm just, you know, looking here and, basically, I mean -- like I say, it goes all the way back to her -- one of his first attorneys. You got --

ahead.

1 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Let's suppose this was covered by the writ of possession. 2 3 have a remedy. MS. RICE: OSC re: contempt? 4 THE COURT: Yes, we can, in the court which 5 issued the order in that case, in the 341 case, 341120. 6 MS. RICE: Okay. 7 8 THE COURT: But what I want, the particular thing that I was trying to understand was why the remedies 9 10 that you are seeking in connection with this motion are 11 appropriate remedies under 128.7. For example, your first 12 thing you request is to either prohibit Ms. Lynch from 13 filing any further motions in this case, and the 14 alternative, to require her to seek leave from the 15 supervising judge of the L.A. Superior Court before filing any further motions. Is that based on the concept that 16 17 she is repeatedly re-litigating this? But why is the --18 I'm sorry, you were going to say yes? 19 MS. RICE: I was going to say that that's 20 I mean, in her motion to tax costs, I mean, correct. 21 there's a section --22 THE COURT: Just a minute. Okay. 23 MS. RICE: I'm sorry. THE COURT: Why is 128.7 the appropriate remedy 24 25 as opposed to seeking to have her declared a vexatious 26 litigant? 27 MS. RICE: We talked about that because of 391 28 B2 or 3, the prong where it's repeatedly re-litigating

1 issues that have already been determined. I think that it 2 is appropriate in this context seeking sanctions under 128.7 D because there are -- if you look at the statutory 3 language, it talks about the court issuing nonmonetary 4 directives, and there's very broad discretions for the 5 6 Court to fashion a very narrowly tailored remedy to sort 7 of preclude the defendant, or the violater, from 8 repeatedly seeking to re-litigate issues. And we're just asking that the Court recognize that we have now responded 9 10 to, effectively, four motions to vacate the default 11 judgment. And, I mean, at some point enough is enough, 12 and, I mean, we could seek the 391 vexatious litigant as 13 well, but I think here --14 THE COURT: Is that -- is the obstacle there 15 finally determined? MS. RICE: No, I don't think that's the 16 obstacle. It's just, you know, she hasn't been a 17 18 plaintiff. 19 THE COURT: In the context of the appeals from 20 the prior order. 21 MS. RICE: Well, the appeals -- actually, we 22 discussed that as well. We don't think the appeal is --23 actually has a preclusive effect because if you look at 917.2 under the Code of Civil Procedure, that if appeal 24 25 from a judgment or order for assignment or delivery of 26 documents or personal property is not stayed, there's not 27 an automatic stay under 916.

28

The sense that

Just a second.

THE COURT: No.

I was asking you the question was, if the appeal is pending, has it -- the issue been finally determined within the vexatious litigant statute? I mean, when I read this, that's what I thought of immediately to require the, you know, the presiding judge to approve future filings. That's sort of the classic vexatious litigant type order.

MS. RICE: Right, but then we cited in our motion for sanctions that the district courts under Rule 11, which is the analogous rule that 128.7 is modeled under, has also taken as a sanction a nonmonetary directive to sort of direct the defendant, who is repeatedly seeking to, you know, sort of revive a judgment that's been final for a long time, you know, that they won't accept the finality of the judgment, to tell them look, you've got your four motions to vacate effectively and enough; no more motions to vacate.

I'm just trying to protect the Court's resources as well as the plaintiff's. I mean, each time we have to respond to one of Ms. Lynch's motions, which repeatedly seeks to re-litigate issues that she has raised and denied in prior motions, it's really -- I mean, being on the receiving end of that, it's not fun. So, I mean, the Court has broad discretion under 128.7, is what we're trying to say, and D is sort of the language we were keying into, is that there is this discretion for the Court to fashion a remedy and be sort of creative and saying look --

1 THE COURT: I know, but it's supposed to be tailored to the nature of the abuse. 2 And let me turn to number two --3 MS. RICE: Okay. 4 THE COURT: -- of what you asked for, and 5 6 that's an order she return attorney-client privileged and 7 confidential documents. Now, if those are within what was 8 covered by the writ of possession --9 MS. RICE: Right. Then you have -- and she's retained 10 THE COURT: 11 those, then you have a remedy. And the remedy is an OSC 12 under that. If it's not covered by the writ of 13 possession, then where am I? The disclosure of the 14 attorney-client privileged and confidential documents, if 15 we can just characterize them that way without -- for that argument, whether they are confidential or not, if it's 16 17 not within that, then if she's got possession of them, what's within -- what's the violation? What is the basis 18 19 for ordering her to surrender those? 20 MS. RICE: Well, it's under the companion case. 21 It's under the judgment. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Then you go and you -- it's 23 to enforce the companion case. The order is there. Now, three: To prohibit Lynch from further 24 25 dissemination or publication of the documents to third

26

27

28

parties. I don't know what she's doing there other than

to the court, other than to filing these. But you mention

a personal web blog. Okay. But I don't really have much

1 of a sense of what has been done there. And the -- you 2 know, I guess this is -- you want a prior restraint. MS. RICE: Well, I mean --3 THE COURT: I mean, is there --4 MS. RICE: Does she have a first amendment right 5 6 to publish attorney-client privileged information? 7 Probably not. I mean, I would think if these have been 8 sealed by Your Honor under 2.551 --THE COURT: What she has filed with the Court 9 has been sealed, but I don't know what she's published. 10 11 MS. RICE: She basically re-published her entire 12 motion for terminating sanctions, and she provided a link 13 to the documents, including all of the exhibits as well. 14 MS. LYNCH: No, I did not, Your Honor. THE COURT: Stop. 15 MS. LYNCH: But I'd like --16 17 THE COURT: You will have an opportunity to 18 speak in a moment. 19 MS. LYNCH: But I did not. 20 MS. RICE: We cited in our moving papers the 21 case of Wallis vs. PHL Associates, and it was kind of 22 analogous, although there was trade secrets involved in 23 that case where there was a declaration that they had submitted under protective order, but the inadvertence of 24 25 the court, it actually got to be that it was available to 26 the public. And the attorney that was trying to defeat 27 the trade secret status was encouraging people to go and 28 download and look at that declaration.

1 And it seems to me that Ms. Lynch, once we did the sealing order back in May, she should have removed these 2 documents from her web blog. I don't know; she may have. 3 I hadn't been tracking it. She can speak to that later, 4 but at least when we filed the motion for sanctions, she 5 6 had actually re-published them on her blog, which is 7 basically even making it more accessible to the public. 8 THE COURT: Is it attached somewhere to one of your exhibits because I don't see it. I don't see 9 10 anything that I can immediately identify as that. 11 MS. RICE: Let me go back. Okay. So, Your 12 Honor, if you look at my Declaration of Michelle Rice in 13 Support of Motion for Sanctions -- it's on Exhibit 4, and 14 I guess it's about --15 THE COURT: I have it. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, motion for -- oh, I'm sorry, Michelle Rice. 16 17 MS. RICE: Correct. It's in support of the 18 motion for sanctions. I'm looking at Exhibit 4, and if you 19 page in about 3 pages in, she's got a link to a Scribd 20 account, wwwscribd, and then Leonard Cohen motion for 21 sanctions against Lynch. 22 THE COURT: Just a minute. I don't know where 23 we're looking. I see her opposition --24 MS. RICE: Right. 25 THE COURT: -- to -- she published her 26 opposition, reply to the motion to seal portions of the 27 court record. 28 MS. RICE: Right.

THE COURT: What about that?

MS. RICE: I think she actually did post it, and it may not be here in the declaration, but I remember we had received something from one of the fans of the Internet, pointing us that she had actually posted her motion for terminating sanctions in toto online, which included the declaration.

THE COURT: Where is that before me today?

MS. RICE: Well, it's -- yeah, we had to file this, obviously, with the 21-day safe harbor.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm trying to understand, you know, I have -- it looks to me like you are seeking a prior restraint and I have -- there's issues with that.

MS. RICE: But, Your Honor, what are the damages once the attorney-client privilege is out there, if you will? Are damages enough? I mean, I understand the prior restraint theory, but then once they're exposed --

about. I don't even know the subject matter of the communications. There is -- we protect attorney-client privileges for certain sorts of policy reasons, and the -- but as far as presuming damages from disclosure, it's -- you know, I don't know if it's invasion of privacy. I don't know what the basis would be. I don't know if there's a statutory basis. I don't know if it's in some sense defamatory, you know.

I don't know. You know, if she publishes false

```
1
     things, you've got a defamation remedy and -- but the
     issue of a prior restraint is tricky. And then the fourth
 2
 3
    thing you want is for me to revoke the order on fee
    waiver.
 4
               MS. RICE: Correct.
 5
 6
               THE COURT: Now, I don't have a copy of that
 7
    before me.
8
               MS. RICE: I think that's also --
               THE COURT: And I don't know what she said in
9
     support of it. That is sealed.
10
11
               MS. RICE: Right.
12
               THE COURT: And what was the duration of the
13
    order on fee waiving? They are of -- ordinarily of
14
    limited duration, are they not?
15
               MS. RICE: They are, but she has been continuing
    to file under that August 9, 2013 fee waiver, her four
16
    motions in this matter and --
17
18
               THE COURT: I don't know. Okay. Yeah, I see.
19
    Was the fee waiver for a particular period of time?
20
               MS. RICE: I think it's supposed to be a
21
    particular time, but then there's the Government Code
22
     Section that we cited it to in our motion for sanctions,
23
     68636F that said if the court gets information that the
    persons obtaining court services in bad faith to sort of
24
25
    harass or vexate or increase the cost of litigation, the
26
    court can actually notify the defendant that she's
    misusing her fee waiver to sort of -- for improper
27
28
    purpose. So, I guess, only for this matter, Your Honor.
```

```
1
     I mean, she does not have a fee waiver for other cases so
 2
    we're -- we cited to in our motion for sanctions that, you
 3
    know --
               MS. LYNCH:
                           I do have a fee waiver on other
 4
     cases, actually. The fraudulent domestic violence matter.
 5
 6
               MS. RICE: Which has been upheld, by the way.
               MS. LYNCH: Is there something you want to say
 7
8
    to me, Michelle?
9
               THE COURT: Don't.
               MS. LYNCH: She said something under her breath
10
11
    to me. I asked her if she had something to say.
12
               THE COURT: You made a comment to her.
13
               MS. RICE: And I responded.
14
               MS. LYNCH: Under her breath.
15
               THE COURT: No. You made a comment to her.
                                                            She
16
    made a comment to you.
               MS. LYNCH: I said I did have a fee waiver in
17
18
    another case. I didn't make an inside remark under my
19
    breath to her. She did to me, which is incredibly
20
    unprofessional.
21
               THE COURT: Ma'am, I will not tolerate calling
22
    names or disparaging remarks.
23
               MS. LYNCH: She just made to me, under her
    breath --
24
25
               THE COURT: Ma'am, you were addressing the
26
    Court. You're not addressing her.
27
               MS. LYNCH: I understand, and I was trying to
28
    explain to you that I do have a fee waiver in another
```

```
1
            That's all.
     case.
 2
               THE COURT:
                           So what.
 3
               MS. LYNCH:
                           It doesn't matter.
               THE COURT:
                           So what.
 4
               MS. LYNCH: Because she gave you misinformation.
 5
     That's all.
 6
 7
               THE COURT:
                           No.
                                I don't think she did.
8
               MS. LYNCH:
                           She said she doesn't have a fee
    waiver in other cases.
9
                           That wasn't quite what -- the one I
10
               THE COURT:
11
    heard.
            I'm sorry. And we're only dealing with this case.
12
               MS. LYNCH:
                           I understand that.
13
               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Now, you wanted to say
14
     something in response to her 128.7 motion.
               MS. LYNCH: You mean to all that you just went
15
    through with her?
16
17
                           I have been addressing her on issues
               THE COURT:
18
    that are of concern to me, and you have attempted to
19
     interrupt a couple of times. And I thought that you
20
    wanted to say something with respect to this motion.
                                                            I'm
21
    giving you the opportunity.
22
               MS. LYNCH: Yes, I would like to. But first, is
23
     there a reason that you're angry with me, Judge Hess?
               THE COURT: I'm not angry with you, ma'am.
24
25
     trying to get you to proceed in an orderly fashion, and
26
    you have insisted upon repeatedly interrupting the other
27
     side. And you have addressed the Court in an angry and
28
     inhospitable tone, and I'd like you to maintain a
```

reasonable decorum here. I'm offering you the opportunity to address her motion. If you wish to accept it, I will hear you. If you do not wish to accept it, I'll move on.

MS. LYNCH: Yes, I wish to accept it. First and foremost, I was not served related case 341120. I have no knowledge of it. I did receive Scott Edelman's letter. So that's number one.

Number two, in the writ of possession, which was, I believe, ex-parte, it lists personal documents. It does not contain the corporate records at all. There's no reference to corporate records being seized. The writ of possession is Leonard Cohen's name personally. It is not in the name of Blue Mist Touring or Traditional Holdings, and the sheriff's department seized corporate records. As of that date, Judge Hess, October 2005, there was not default judgment transferring my ownership interest in these entities to Leonard Cohen. So I have an objection to this idea that corporate records are Leonard Cohen's personal property, let alone that the corporation themselves are.

THE COURT: I'm not deciding that. That issue is not before me.

MS. LYNCH: I know, but that was an issue that Michelle Rice brought up, the seized property. You asked me if I'd like to respond.

THE COURT: I don't know if they're -- I don't know if -- what records you are talking about as corporate?

```
1
              MS. LYNCH: Okay. Well, first of all --
               THE COURT: Communications between Mr. Cohen --
 2
     she's talking about this in terms of communications
 3
    between Mr. Cohen and his various attorneys.
 4
              MS. LYNCH: Do you think corporate minutes are
 5
 6
     communications between --
 7
               THE COURT: Ma'am, that -- I don't know what
8
    you're talking about. I don't know why you're talking
     corporate minutes because that isn't what I was discussing
9
10
    with Miss Rice. What she was raising was the issue of the
11
     correspondence between Mr. Cohen and his attorneys with
12
    various -- his attorneys.
13
              MS. LYNCH:
                           I understand, but what I'm saying
14
     is, the writ of possession addresses -- first of all,
15
    Leonard Cohen abandoned that property at my house and
    didn't pick it up. It was there since 1996. I would just
16
17
     like that on the record.
18
               THE COURT: Considering that it includes records
19
    through 2004, I don't think so.
20
              MS. LYNCH: It didn't include records through
21
     2004.
22
               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry. The writ of possession.
23
              MS. LYNCH: I did not have --
               THE COURT: The writ of possession includes
24
25
    records through 2004.
26
              MS. LYNCH: But they weren't in my home or in my
27
    possession. I'm telling you they weren't. Leonard Cohen
28
    and his daughter went into my home.
```

1 We are not today adjudicating --THE COURT: 2 MS. LYNCH: I understand. 3 THE COURT: There you go interrupting me again. By saying I understand? 4 MS. LYNCH: In the middle of a sentence. THE COURT: 5 Т 6 was -- I don't know what you think I was going to say, but it's apparent that I can't -- that I can't say anything 7 8 without your interrupting. You just go ahead; and when 9 you're done, you stop. MS. LYNCH: Michelle Rice talked at length about 10 11 issues, and I was just trying to address a few of the 12 highlights of those issues you asked me about. I'd like 13 to comment. 14 So I said the writ of possession, which was just 15 addressed with Michelle Rice as it relates to these documents that they showed you, were attached to my motion 16 17 to terminate. That was an issue that they raised. Right, 18 Judge Hess, that the two of you just discussed? So what 19 I'm saying is, these are corporate records. These aren't 20 all letters with Leonard Cohen's attorneys, and the 21 sheriff's department seized corporate property. So that 22 wasn't part of the writ of possession. 23 THE COURT: So what did you do? What did you do 24 with that? Did you go back and seek the return of 25 property improperly seized? 26 MS. LYNCH: I wasn't given an inventory and had no idea what was seized, to be honest with you. I found 27

28

out about the inventory later when I received a copy a

number of years later. Neal Greenberg, the investigator who sued Leonard Cohen and Robert Kory for civil conspiracy, extortion, bribery, et cetera, tried to 3 intervene in a related case here in an attempt to preserve 4 the evidence. They mention the corporate property of Blue Mist Touring and Traditional Holdings and said they felt this was Leonard Cohen's attempt to conceal evidence from Judge Babcock in the Colorado -- in that case. So no, I didn't have an opportunity to do anything, Judge Hess. I wasn't served.

MS. RICE: May I be heard on that issue, Your Honor?

MS. LYNCH: I'd like to just finish.

THE COURT: I have stopped her. Don't jump down my throat if she starts interrupting. I held up my hand to stop her. She stopped, and then you made a comment. Go ahead with your remarks.

MS. LYNCH: So, basically, that's it with respect to the writ of position. Then there was a couple other things that were mentioned. Yes, I did advise Judge Babcock in the Federal District Court of Denver that I refused to participate. I was only added with respect to interpleaded funds due to my belief that the lawsuit was an attempt to cover up tax fraud. That's accurate. served, and there was no issue with respect to service.

There was one other issue. One moment, please. With respect to my blog, I do not have these documents on my blog nor did I, at any time whatsoever, link all evidence

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

```
1
     to the blog. I have -- prior to submitting this motion
    to -- for terminating sanctions, I prepared the
 2
    declaration for the Internal Revenue Service. It was
 3
     submitted to them on March 1, 2015 with this evidence and
 4
    that declaration, and the evidence was submitted to tax
 5
 6
    court in another matter that is still proceeding. So when
 7
    Michelle Rice says transmitting or whatever, disseminating
8
    property or disseminating these documents, that is where
     it was disseminated to, the Internal Revenue Service, and
9
    also to tax court. And I don't know if there was any
10
11
    other issue.
12
               THE COURT: Is this River Deep blog spot dot com
13
    your -- you?
14
              MS. LYNCH: Yes, that is my blog, and when you
15
    seal --
               THE COURT: Is there a link? I see a link on
16
17
    here --
18
               MS. LYNCH: Yes.
19
               THE COURT: -- to your motion for terminating
20
     sanctions.
21
              MS. LYNCH: But my motions do not have the
22
     exhibits attached.
23
               THE COURT: I don't know.
24
               MS. LYNCH: I'm telling you that. And when you
25
     sealed them, there were a couple of links. One, for
26
     instance, to my declaration. I removed that from the blog
    and -- what is it, Michelle?
27
28
               MS. RICE: I didn't say anything.
```

1 THE COURT: She didn't say anything. MS. RICE: I'm just being, and she's objecting. 2 THE COURT: Would you care to finish? Go ahead. 3 MS. LYNCH: There were a couple of links, not to 4 each and every -- by the way, Michelle, I just want to say 5 6 this for the record, please, because this has gone on 7 twice now in hearings with you. Michelle Rice has sealed 8 documents, asked you to -- that are available on Pay Serve 9 that I purchased through them or attached to Neal 10 Greenberg's lawsuit -- are available through the Southern 11 District of New York, Leonard Cohen's declaration. And at 12 no point does she ever correct this with you, which I find 13 deeply offensive because they are not attorney-client 14 privileged documents of Leonard Cohen's. And I bought 15 some of them, you know. I mean, I think when we're speaking to a court and we're saying something is 16 17 attorney-client privilege, that that should mean that the 18 documents that were sealed were attorney-client privilege. 19 Judge Hess, do you actually believe that my personal 20 K1 partnership document is an attorney-client privileged 21 document of Leonard Cohen's because that's under seal, my 22 own K1. It's very frustrating. 23 THE COURT: Were there any other comments you wish to make with respect to the 128.7 motion? 24 25 MS. LYNCH: Yes. Me or her? MS. RICE: To which one? 26 27 MS. LYNCH: The last point would be, I don't 28 believe that when someone attempts to address ongoing

litigation, misconduct, perjured statements, fraudulent misrepresentations, that that is an attempt to file anything frivolous.

The bottom line is, it's never going to change, Judge Hess. Neither I nor anyone in my home was served or sub served. So that is always going to be a fact. I mean, I don't understand what we're supposed to do. Just make things up to please someone else? That didn't happen.

THE COURT: Ma'am, you were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate this in your original motion filed in 2013.

MS. LYNCH: Without witnesses.

THE COURT: You presented the evidence that you thought was appropriate for that. You had a full and fair opportunity to do it. We are not required to take oral testimony on those motions. You had the ability, you had the -- excuse me, you had the opportunity to present appropriate evidence at that time, and the Court ruled upon it on the merits.

And the fundamental point I'm getting from Miss Rice's presentation is that you are attempting to re-litigate this over and over and over again, and you have your remedy notionally in the Court of Appeal if you think I was incorrect in either of the rulings that I've made against you. I understand you now have two appeals in the Court of Appeal. You have the opportunity to present your record there. That's fine, but you keep coming back to the trial court and renewing these arguments.

MS. LYNCH: I mean, in all fairness to myself, they did file a motion to renew the judgment. I mean, am I supposed to just sit there silently? I mean, I was not served these documents or sub service. Judge Hess, you have declarations from my son, Rutger, Paulette Brandt. I didn't forge these either, which I was falsely accused of, I might note, and other people who were there, and they lived with me or were there. I think it's very unfair if you're saying all of my declarants are liars.

THE COURT: Ma'am, the court ruled on the basis of the evidence before it in those prior matters. This is an attempt to re-litigate the same issue that's been ruled against you twice.

MS. LYNCH: This is an attempt to respond to a motion to renew, their renewal of judgment, which includes suspended corporations. It's my understanding this is illegal, actually, to include -- to represent, in any way, a suspended corporation, but there's nothing else to file with you, Judge Hess.

You're correct. I don't agree with your decisions and, therefore, I appealed them. That's all. I am not going to be before you again.

THE COURT: And I don't have any problem with the fact that you appealed.

MS. LYNCH: Right.

THE COURT: I am troubled by your remedy.

MS. RICE: It was just a suggestion, you know.

128.7D gives you broad discretion to fashion any remedy

that you feel is appropriate to deter the future
misconduct. My fear, and I'll just go on the record about
this, is that if we don't have any kind of, sort of
fail-safe in place here with an order, sanctions order,
she's going to come back. I mean, she's going to do a
motion for re-consideration.

THE COURT: This is up on appeal.

MS. RICE: It is.

THE COURT: And it seems to me that the Court of Appeals will do with it what the Court of Appeals will do. And once there is a final decision by the Court of Appeals on these motions that's going -- that if it is adverse to her, that's going to cut this off and --

MS. RICE: We hope.

THE COURT: At that point, you know, I have deep reservations about prior restraints on her speech, and it seems to me that you have other remedies if you believe that the order in the 338 case was violated. I think you've got a remedy in that case if it was not turned over, I think, but you've got to make a showing of that, and that's where you proceed. And when we talk about prior approval for filing new motions, I think that's got to be a vexatious litigant statute because she's doing this all in pro per. If you can establish the criteria for that, then you bring the motion. She can oppose it and --

MS. RICE: But there's a case, if I may,
Ringgold Lockhart, which we cited, which is Ninth Circuit,

came out last year, which said that instead of going to the Rambo sort of vexatious litigant, which would be a prefiling order that would block Ms. Lynch from filing in all matters in Superior Court and she gets listed on the Judicial Council list, you go with more narrowly tailored sort of -- you know, you go increasingly severe sanctions. I don't think she's at the point where 391 B2 is actually -- we would even be able to obtain it.

So we're just asking for very narrowly, I think, tailored under the Ringgold Lockhart, the precedent on the Ninth Circuit that said that sanctions that are very narrowly tailored to the conduct should be sort of the first-tier approach instead of going Rambo, if you will, because it's just in this case.

We're not saying we're asking Ms. Lynch not be able to file any other matters. We're just saying in this case, at some point you have to kind of cut her off because she is repeating and recycling and seeking to get another determination on matters that have already been decided, and it's imposing a lot of costs on the plaintiff as well as on the Court's time. So that's just sort of -- what we would just sort of suggest to the Court is that was our mind set when we drafted this proposed order, is that, you know, there's got to be some remedy for us at this point to keep responding to these types of motions. We have to be able to go back to the client and say look, she's not going to file another motion to vacate. You know what I mean? Kind of where we are.

Then in terms of the fee waiver, I mean, we were just asking that it be revoked specifically for this case and that it's not an onerous burden on Ms. Lynch to actually pay the \$60, which is the filing fee. I mean, if she feels that she has another motion in her -- \$60 is really not too onerous to require her --

THE COURT: No. I don't know what her financial condition is. It was presented to the judge or the commissioner, who refused these things. I'm not supposed to know what, you know, that information. Whatever financial declaration she submitted is under seal so --

MS. RICE: But with respect to making the showing that she is actually in violation of the other orders, I was under the impression that since these are two companion cases -- and we've always been putting on the case caption related-case, I think that she -- we've made the showing that these documents that she put in as exhibits with her motion for terminating sanctions, at least 41 of them are documents that were covered under the order of writ of possession in 2005. I mean, I don't know what more of a showing, I mean, by way of an --

THE COURT: I don't remember what those were.

They were not incorporated into your moving papers. I

don't know what specific documents they were.

MS. RICE: In the request for judicial notice that we did in the supplement, we actually did a listing.

THE COURT: Of the boxes. There was a listing of boxes of documents.

1 MS. RICE: Correct, but --Exhibit 6, I think it was. THE COURT: 2 3 MS. RICE: Yes. THE COURT: Sheriff's inventory. 4 MS. RICE: Correct. 5 THE COURT: Listing. 6 MS. RICE: But if you actually look at the --7 8 THE COURT: I have no notion what that relates I've got no idea what the correlation is between that 9 10 and anything else. 11 MS. RICE: Well, if you look at page 3 of our 12 request for judicial notice, which was the supplement, I 13 actually list on page 3 the exhibits that we argue are in 14 the categories that should have been returned to Mr. Cohen 15 under the writ of possession. And that's on page 3. And there's 41 documents that were listed there. So, you 16 know, in terms of specificity, we're saying that those 17 18 would arguably fall within the categories that are 19 encompassed within the writ of possession, item 3C. 20 THE COURT: I think you need to make a focused 21 motion based on the writ of possession because this is --22 this is the supplemental request filed just a couple of 23 days ago, and it was not part of your moving papers, not part of the motion that was originally made. So I think 24 25 that that --26 MS. RICE: In my defense, those -- these are 27 from ten years ago. We did have to go through the 28 archives to pull these out. I mean, these are ten years

ago. It's amazing we still have them and, you know, eleven years after Ms. Lynch has been terminated, she still refuses to return Mr. Cohen's property which, again, I think she's already -- pretty clear that she's in contempt of those two orders. So what you're recommending, Your Honor, is that we come back with an OSC.

THE COURT: I'm not giving you legal advice, but it seems to me if you have a valid subsisting judgment in that case but you know she's going to claim she was never served --

MS. RICE: Can I just follow up?

THE COURT: No. She's already told you that she was -- that she's going to claim that she was never served with the summons and complaint on that other one. So, you know, at some point you are likely to have to dance the dance again. So, you know, I don't know. And I don't know because I have not examined what the validity of any such claim might be so --

MS. RICE: Can I just make one follow up along with that, Your Honor? She does claim she was never served with the writ of possession documents, but we had submitted Edelman's declaration in our first opposition to her motion to vacate in Exhibit E; actually shows Ms.

Lynch was personally served the documents on October 11, 2005 at 6:15 p.m. There was no sub service involved. It was personal service, and that's Exhibit E of the Edelman declaration.

1 So Ms. Lynch -- it's amazing that she, you know, strains credulity, that she continues to maintain that 2 she's never been served documents. 3 MS. LYNCH: Are we arguing that --4 THE COURT: Just a second. I don't need you to 5 6 argue her credibility on that. I'm going to deny your 7 128.7 motion. I don't think that the remedies here that 8 you propose are well-tailored for this. 9 MS. RICE: Okay. THE COURT: And this is without prejudice to 10 your seeking alternative remedies on other theories, but I 11 12 don't think it's 128.7. All right. That's the Court's 13 ruling. Does anybody feel you need a written order, or is 14 the order on the record sufficient? 15 MS. RICE: We submitted a proposed order, one for the motion to tax costs and one for the motion to 16 vacate the renewed judgment. It should be there. 17 18 THE COURT: Here's the motion on the order to 19 tax costs. I've signed the orders denying Ms. Lynch two 20 motions, and the 128.7 motion is also denied. You need a 21 written order on that. 22 MS. RICE: Yes, because we'll probably be back. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, defense. If you want to submit a written order on the denial of their 24 25 128.7 motion, you're welcome to do that. 26 MS. LYNCH: I don't have one today. So I'll 27 prepare it and bring it. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 28

```
MS. LYNCH: Have a good day.
 1
     (Proceedings concluded at 11:03 a.m.)
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
```

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
3	LEONARD NORMAN COHEN,			
4	Plaintiff,) SUPERIOR COURT			
5	vs.) CASE NO. BC338322			
6	KELLEY LYNCH,			
7	Defendant.)			
8				
9	I, NANCY JO HUTCH, CSR No. 13732,			
10	official reporter of the Superior Court of the State of			
11	California, for the County of Los Angeles, do hereby certify			
12	that the foregoing pages, 1 through 42, comprise a full,			
13	true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken in the			
14	above-entitled cause on October 6, 2015.			
15	Dated this 9th day of October, 2015			
16				
17	Nancy 2 th to			
18	Nancy Jo Hutch, CSR No. 13732 Court Reporter			
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
877.451.1580 www.aikenwelch.com				
MOTION/ SANCTION/ PLTE HEARING 10/06/2015				

Page 43 Index: \$154,000..assume

	2014 2:14 11:7	9:46 2:1	allege 3:8
\$	2015 2:10,17,18 31:4		alleged 2:26 11:10
\$154,000 8:25	21-day 23:10	A	alleges 3:9
\$60 37:4,5	22 2:18	a.m. 2:1 41:2 abandoned 28:15	alternative 17:14 40:11
1	3	ability 33:16	amazing 39:1 40:1
1 22:15 31:4	3 17:28 22:15,19 38:11,	Absolutely 13:7	amendment 21:5
11 19:10 39:25	13,15	abuse 20:2	analogous 19:10 21:22
11:03 41:2	3.1700 7:6,16	accept 19:15 27:2,3,4	and/or 2:13
12 15:10	30 13:14	accessible 22:7	angry 26:23,24,27
128.7 10:24 11:1,2	338 35:18	account 22:20	apparent 29:7
12:11,22 17:11,24 18:3 19:10,24 26:14 32:24	341 17:6	accrued 5:17,22	appeal 2:21 18:22,24
40:7,12,20,25	341120 17:6 27:5	accurate 30:24	19:1 33:23,26 35:7
128.7B 12:12	391 17:27 18:12 36:7	accused 11:14 34:6	appealed 9:13 34:21,
128.7B1 12:24	3C 15:16 16:10 38:19	action 9:20	appeals 18:19,21 33:25
128.7D 34:28	4	actual 5:6	35:10,11
13 2:10	A 22:42.40	add 4:27 6:1	appearance 8:27 12:2
14 11:8	4 22:13,18	added 30:22	appears 2:22
15 5:18,22 7:17 14:14	41 13:2,19 37:19 38:16	address 8:17 27:2 29:11 32:28	apple 2:23
17 2:14,16	5	addressed 26:27	approach 36:13
18 7:14	5 15:13	29:15	approval 35:22
1960 16:12	5G 15:13,14	addresses 28:14	approve 19:5
1980 16:13,14		addressing 25:25,26 26:17	archives 38:28
1995 16:13	6	adjudicating 29:1	arguably 38:18
1996 28:16	6 38:2	adverse 35:12	argue 15:12 16:8 38:13 40:6
2	60B 11:25	advice 39:8	argued 3:11
2 22:45	685.070 6:7	advise 30:20	arguing 9:24 40:4
2 22:15 2.551 21:8	68636F 24:23	adviser 8:20	argument 4:7 5:2,4,5,8
2004 14:21 16:13,14	6:15 39:26	advisers 11:11 13:26	7:28 8:11 10:11 20:16
28:19,21,25		15:5 16:25	arguments 2:12 12:19 33:28
2005 8:20 14:25 15:10	9	affirmative 12:9	assert 9:14
27:15 37:20 39:26	9 24:16	aggressive 4:12	assets 8:10,15,16
2006 5:18,22 14:14 2008 8:20 9:12	90 13:1,19	agree 34:20	10:17
2013 2:12 11:6 24:16	916 18:27	ahead 16:18 29:8 30:17 32:3 40:23	assignment 18:25
33:11	917.2 18:24	allegations 11:16	Associates 21:21
		12:14	assume 7:4

Index: attached..conveying

attached 13:2 22:8 29:16 31:22 32:9

attempt 2:22 3:21 30:4, 7,24 33:2 34:12,14

attempted 26:18

attempting 5:27 9:13 13:15 33:21

attempts 14:23 32:28

attorney 9:21 14:1 21:26

attorney-client 13:3, 10,15,20,22 15:2 20:6, 14 21:6 23:16,21 32:13, 17,18.20

attorneys 10:7 12:15 13:4,5 14:16 16:28 28:4,11,12 29:20

August 11:6 24:16

authorities 12:3

authority 11:23 12:7

automatic 18:27

awarded 7:27 8:7,13

aware 6:25 9:11

В

B1 11:2,4

B2 12:11 17:28 36:7

Babcock 9:4 10:1 30:8, 21

back 10:14 11:8,26 12:8,25 16:27 22:2,11 29:24 33:27 35:5 36:26 39:6 40:22

bad 7:25 8:1,11 9:25 24:24

banks 16:15

bar 9:16

based 2:26 10:5 17:16 38:21

basic 5:8

basically 11:16,18,26 12:1 16:26 21:11 22:7 30:18

basis 7:3 11:6 13:17 20:18 23:25,26 34:10

BC338322 14:13

BC341120 14:19

beg 3:13 7:8

begin 5:9

belief 30:23

bill 5:15

bite 2:23 3:1.2

bizarre 10:6

block 9:16 36:3

blog 20:28 22:3,6 30:27,28 31:1,12,14,26

blow 13:15

Blue 10:4 27:13 30:5

bottom 33:4

bought 32:14

boxes 37:27,28

Brandt 4:24 34:5

breath 25:10,14,19,24

bribery 30:3

bring 35:25 40:27

broad 16:1,11,21 18:5 19:24 34:28

brought 27:24

burden 37:3

business 13:25 14:22, 24,28 15:3 16:13,21

C

California 7:6 12:3,7

called 4:13

calling 25:21

caption 37:16

car 4:23

care 5:26 32:3

case 8:27 9:3,21 10:5 11:21,23 14:13,15,17, 19 17:6,13 20:20,23

21:21,23 25:18 26:1,11 27:5 30:4,8 35:18,19,27 36:14,16 37:2,16 39:10

cases 11:25 25:1,5 26:9 37:15

categories 14:28 15:28 16:10,20 38:14, 18

category 15:3

caused 12:27 13:8

cetera 30:3

Chad 4:26

challenge 5:16

chance 14:7

change 3:6 5:9 33:4

characterize 20:15

Circuit 35:28 36:11

cite 7:16 11:23

cited 11:24 19:8 21:20 24:22 25:2 35:28

civil 6:7 10:24 18:24 30:2

claim 2:19 4:21,22,23, 24 9:14 39:10,14,19,21

claiming 11:26

claims 8:23 9:17

classic 19:6

clear 16:20 39:4

client 36:26

co-occupant 4:5,26

Code 6:7 10:24 18:24 24:21

codefendant 8:2 13:28

Cohen 2:2,4 8:7,24 9:6, 22,23 10:4,7,14 11:10 13:4,14 14:22 15:4,7 22:20 27:17 28:2,4,11, 15,27 30:2 38:14

Cohen's 10:23 13:10, 22,24 14:1,16,22 15:24 16:23,25 27:12,18 29:20 30:7 32:11,14,21 39:3 collateral 9:18

Colorado 8:18,19 9:11, 16,20,26 10:4 30:8

commenced 2:1

comment 25:12,15,16 29:13 30:16

comments 32:23

commissioner 37:9

committed 11:10 12:15

communications

13:3,11,20,23 14:3 15:4 23:21 28:2,3,6

companion 14:19 20:20,23 37:15

complaint 6:26 8:2 12:4,5 39:15

comply 15:18

conceal 30:7

concept 17:16

concern 26:18

concluded 41:2

conclusory 11:15 12:14

condition 37:8

conduct 36:12

confidential 15:2 20:7, 14,16

confusion 7:20

connection 17:10

conspiracy 30:3

constructive 7:26 8:8,

contempt 15:20 17:4 39:5

context 18:2.19

continually 4:11

continues 40:2

continuing 24:15

conveying 15:24

copy 15:8 24:6 29:28 **corporate** 14:18 27:10,

11,14,18,28 28:5,9 29:19,21 30:5

corporation 6:15,16, 18,27 27:19 34:18

corporations 6:11,17, 20 7:25 8:1,3,4,7,15 10:17 16:16 34:16

correct 7:15 8:28 10:27 17:20 22:17 24:5 32:12 34:20 38:1,5

correlation 38:9

correspondence

14:24 16:12,13,21,25 28:11

cost 24:25

costs 5:12,14,15,21 6:12,19 7:2,18,19 10:21 17:20 36:20 40:16,19

Council 36:5

couple 26:19 30:19 31:25 32:4 38:22

court 2:2,7,18,19,25 3:4,7,13,17,22,25,27 4:7,10,15,18,21,25 5:1, 11,20,25 6:3,6,14,16, 18,22 7:4,6,8,11,16,21 8:9,26 9:1,16,28 10:19, 28 12:9 13:6,9,27 14:9, 11 15:6,8,11,18,20 16:17 17:1,5,8,15,22,24 18:4,6,9,14,19,28 19:24,27 20:1,5,10,22, 27 21:4,9,15,17,25 22:8,15,22,25,27 23:1, 8,11,19 24:6,9,12,18, 23,24,26 25:9,12,15,21, 25,26 26:2,4,7,10,13, 17,24,27 27:21,26 28:2, 7,18,22,24 29:1,3,5,23 30:14,21 31:6,10,12,16, 19,23 32:1,3,16,23 33:9,13,18,23,26,28 34:10,23,26 35:7,9,10, 11,15 36:4,22 37:7,22, 27 38:2,4,6,8,20 39:8,

court's 8:25 19:18 36:21 40:12

13 40:5,10,18,23,28

courts 19:9

cover 30:24

covered 17:2 20:8,12 37:19

creative 19:27

credibility 40:6

credulity 40:2

criteria 35:24

current 13:4

custodian 8:22

cut 35:13 36:17

D

damages 23:15,17,23

dance 39:16,17

data 12:17

date 27:15

dated 15:9

daughter 28:28

day 41:1

days 7:10,14,17 14:27 38:23

dealing 26:11

decided 9:26 36:19

deciding 27:21

decision 35:11

decisions 34:20

declarants 34:9

declaration 13:1.2

21:23,28 22:12 23:3,7 31:3,5,26 32:11 37:11

39:23,28

declarations 11:15

13:27 34:5

declared 17:25

decorum 27:1

deep 31:12 35:15

deeply 32:13

defamation 24:1

defamatory 23:27

default 2:13 3:23 5:22 7:27 8:8,13 12:8,16,18, 20 14:14 18:10 27:16

defeat 21:26

defendant 8:5,19 9:2 12:20 15:15,17 18:7 19:12 24:26

defense 38:26 40:23

delivery 18:25

denial 40:24

denied 2:15,20 10:20, 22 11:7 19:21 40:20

Denver 30:21

deny 40:6

denying 40:19

department 27:14

29:21

deter 35:1

determination 36:19

determined 18:1,15 19:2

difficult 4:5

direct 19:12

directed 5:21,23 7:5

directive 19:12

directives 18:5

directly 4:27

disclosed 13:20 16:2

disclosing 16:5

disclosure 13:21

20:13 23:23

20.10 20.20

discretion 19:24,26 34:28

34.20

discretions 18:5

discussed 18:22 29:18

discussing 28:9

dismissal 12:5

disparaging 25:22

disseminated 31:9

disseminating 31:7,8

dissemination 20:25

district 8:18,26 9:4,10, 16,26 19:9 30:21 32:11

document 32:20,21

documents 14:28 15:2,28 16:2,5,15 18:26 20:7,14,25 21:13 22:3 27:9 29:16 30:27 31:8

32:8,14,18 34:4 37:17, 19,24,28 38:16 39:22,

25 40:3

domestic 25:5

door 4:27

dot 31:12

download 21:28

drafted 36:23

due 30:23

Dunn 14:16,25

duration 24:12,14

Ε

Edelman 14:25 15:6 39:27

Edelman's 27:6 39:23

effect 18:23

effectively 18:10 19:16

efforts 15:25

eleven 11:8 12:26 39:2

employment 16:22

encompass 16:1

encompassed 38:19

encouraging 21:27

end 19:23

enforce 20:23

entered 2:10 3:23 5:18 6:24 9:12 14:14

entire 21:11

entities 7:1 9:8 27:17

entitled 6:1,8

fourth 24:2 equitable 8:9 **fans** 23:4 30:11 frank 4:14 **essentially** 2:11 4:16 fashion 18:6 19:27 hearings 32:7 26:25 34:28 establish 35:24 fraud 9:5 11:11 12:16 **held** 15:20 30:15 fear 35:2 30:24 estoppel 9:19 **Hess** 3:16 4:9 5:6 9:27 **federal** 10:9,13,15 fraudulent 5:23 6:2 10:6 26:23 27:15 29:18 **evidence** 30:5,7,28 11:24 30:21 12:17 25:5 33:1 30:9 32:19 33:5 34:4,19 31:4,5 33:13,18 34:11 **frivolous** 12:11,13 33:3 **fee** 24:3,13,16,19,27 **hiding** 15:27 **ex-parte** 13:9,17 15:6, 25:1,4,17,28 26:8 37:1, front 4:27 22 27:9 highlights 29:12 examined 39:18 frustrating 32:22 hire 12:27 **feel** 4:16 35:1 40:13 excuse 6:18 33:17 full 33:9,14 **hits** 12:12 feeling 11:27 exercised 8:9 **fun** 19:23 **hitting** 13:13 feels 37:5 Exhibit 15:13 22:13,18 fund 10:25 hold 13:25 felt 30:6 38:2 39:24.27 fundamental 33:20 Holdings 8:23 9:7,10, female 4:4 **exhibits** 13:2,12,19 15,17,23,24 10:3,13 funds 8:21.22.25 9:6 file 7:17 23:9 24:16 33:2 27:13 30:6 14:1 21:13 22:9,15 30:23 31:22 37:18 38:13 34:2,18 36:16,27 home 4:20,22,23,24 future 19:5 35:1 exists 4:6 filed 2:16.21 7:14 11:5. 28:26,28 33:5 8 14:6 21:9 22:5 33:11 honest 29:27 **explain** 5:26 25:28 38:22 G exposed 23:18 **Honor** 3:2 8:18 11:2 filing 11:5 12:28 17:13, 13:7,18 14:10 16:19 **gave** 26:5 15 20:27 35:22 36:3 extent 2:26 9:24 21:8,14 22:12 23:15 37:4 general 12:1 extort 5:27 24:28 30:12 39:6,21 **filings** 13:27 19:6 **Gibson** 14:16,25 extortion 30:3 hope 35:14 final 11:22 19:14 35:11 giving 26:21 39:8 extraneous 11:12 hostile 4:12 finality 19:15 good 2:3 8:5 9:9 41:1 house 5:7 28:15 F finally 18:15 19:2 Government 24:21 human 5:28 **financial** 5:24 6:2 gravamen 8:1 hundred 11:9 12:26 fact 3:5 5:6 6:25 33:6 12:17 16:14 37:7,11 34:24 Greenberg 30:1 **find** 32:12 facts 5:5,8 Greenberg's 32:10 fine 33:27 factually 12:13 guess 21:2 22:14 24:28 idea 9:19 27:18 29:27 finish 30:13 32:3 38:9 fail-safe 35:4 firm 12:27 Н failed 8:27 identify 22:10 first-tier 36:13 illegal 6:10 34:17 Failure 15:17 **hand** 30:15 focused 38:20 fair 33:10,14 imagine 16:4 happen 33:8 **follow** 39:12,20 fairly 16:20 immediately 19:4 harass 11:13 24:25 foremost 27:5 22:10 fairness 34:1 harassment 11:4 **forge** 34:6 imposing 36:20 12:25 faith 24:24 formed 8:4 impression 37:14 **harbor** 23:10 **fall** 38:18 forms 10:26 improper 24:27 hear 27:3 false 11:6 23:28 found 29:27 improperly 29:25 heard 2:14,18 26:11 falsely 34:6

invasion 23:24 impropriety 2:27 jurisdictional 12:7,10 links 31:25 32:4 inadvertence 21:24 **inventory** 29:26,28 list 36:5 38:13 Κ inapposite 11:24,25 listed 15:28 36:4 38:16 12:18 investigator 30:1 listing 37:26,27 38:6 **K1** 32:20,22 inappropriate 14:4 investment 8:20 lists 27:9 Kelley 2:6 15:15 include 28:20 34:17 Investments 2:4 **litigant** 17:26 18:12 keying 19:26 included 13:12 14:2 involved 21:22 39:26 19:3,6 35:23 36:2 kind 8:15 21:21 35:3 15:1 23:7 irrelevant 7:28 8:12.14 litigate 33:10 36:17,28 includes 28:18.24 9:25 **litigation** 8:18 9:11 kinds 11:10 14:2 34:15 **issue** 19:2 24:2 27:21, 24:25 33:1 **Knaak** 4:26 including 16:11,14 23 28:10 29:17 30:11, lived 34:8 25,26 31:11 34:12 21:13 knowledge 27:6 **LLC** 8:23 inconsistent 8:23 issued 15:22 17:6 **Kory** 2:5 6:24 12:15 Lockhart 35:28 36:10 30:2 **issues** 10:16 18:1,8 incorporated 37:23 19:21 23:13 26:17 long 19:14 incorrect 33:24 29:11.12 L longer 16:6 increase 24:25 issuing 18:4 lost 2:28 **L.A.** 17:15 increasingly 36:6 item 15:16 16:10 38:19 lot 36:20 lacked 2:19 incredibly 25:19 lying 5:9 J language 18:4 19:25 individual 4:6 **Lynch** 2:2,6,12,16,19, **information** 15:3 21:6 law 2:5 11:14 12:27 24 3:2,5,10,15,19,24,26 **January** 2:14 11:7 24:23 37:10 lawsuit 3:3 30:23 32:10 4:4,9,13,16,19,22 5:4, judge 3:16 4:9 5:5 8:26 inhospitable 26:28 19,23,27 6:5,8,15,17, **lawver** 13:14 9:4,5,22,27 10:1,6 20,23 7:7,9,12,20 8:14, **inside** 25:18 17:15 19:5 26:23 27:15 **leave** 10:8 17:14 19,24,27,28 9:2,8,11, 29:18 30:8,9,20 32:19 insisted 26:26 13,24,27 10:1 11:5 **left** 10:15 33:4 34:4,19 37:8 12:13 13:5,24,28 14:21 instance 31:26 legal 11:19 39:8 15:5,15,21,23 16:9,16, judgment 2:9,14,26,27 21 17:12 20:24 21:14, intentional 13:21 3:23 5:17,22 6:13,21,24 legally 12:11 16,19 22:1,21 25:4,7, 7:5,19,27 8:8,13 9:12, interest 5:17.21 6:1.2 length 29:10 10,14,17,23,27 26:3,5, 15,22 10:2,20 11:22 14:18 27:16 8,12,15,22 27:4,23 12:16,18 14:13,14,18 **Leonard** 2:4 10:4,7,14 28:1,5,13,20,23,26 interests 5:24 18:11,25 19:13,15 22:20 27:12,17,18 29:2,4,10,26 30:13,18 20:21 27:16 34:2,15 28:15,27 29:20 30:2,7 **Internal** 31:3,9 31:14,18,21,24 32:4,25, 39:9 40:17 32:11,14,21 27 33:12 34:1,14,25 Internet 23:5 judgments 14:12 let alone 27:19 36:3,15 37:3 39:2,25 interpleaded 8:24 40:1,4,19,26 41:1 judicata 9:19 letter 14:27 27:6 30:23 **Lynch's** 2:9 8:10 9:17 iudicial 14:7 15:9,14 **letters** 29:20 interpleader 9:20 14:26 19:20 36:5 37:25 38:12 liar 4:13 interposed 11:4 **July** 2:10 M liars 34:9 interrupt 9:1 16:17 jump 30:14 26:19 **limited** 15:1 16:12 **June** 2:18 **made** 2:12 4:2,8 5:2,13, 24:14 interrupting 4:11 14 12:1 14:23 25:12,15, 26:26 29:3,8 30:15 jurisdiction 2:19 8:9 link 21:12 22:19 30:28 16,23 30:16 33:24 12:1 31:16 intervene 30:4 37:17 38:24

notices 2:21 ordered 9:22 **mail** 7:13 Mist 10:4 27:13 30:6 main 12:23 14:13,17 misusing 24:27 **notify** 24:26 ordering 20:19 maintain 8:4 26:28 modeled 19:10 notion 38:8 orderly 26:25 40:2 modify 2:13 notionally 33:23 orders 37:14 39:5 maintained 14:22 40:19 number 6:10 20:3 27:7, moment 21:18 30:26 make 8:27 9:14 12:24 8 30:1 ordinarily 24:13 monetary 14:17 25:18 32:24 33:7 35:20 original 2:27 5:17 38:20 39:20 **months** 11:8 0 33:10 making 12:13 22:7 morning 2:3 originally 38:24 37:12 object 9:20 motion 2:9,11,13,16,25 **OSC** 17:4 20:11 39:7 male 4:26 5:11,14,20 6:12,19 7:2, objecting 32:2 4,6,17 10:19,20,23,26 outstanding 10:12,16 managed 10:8 **objection** 12:8 27:17 11:5,9,19,28 12:2,25 owner 9:6 manager 13:25 16:23 14:2,6 16:3,5,24 17:10, objections 12:10 20 19:9 21:12 22:5,13, ownership 27:16 manner 4:11 **obstacle** 18:14,17 16,18,20,26 23:6 24:22 25:2 26:14,20 27:2 manners 7:13 obtain 36:8 P 29:16 31:1,19 32:24 **March** 2:16 16:3,5,24 obtained 15:7 33:10 34:2,15 35:6,25 31:4 p.m. 39:26 36:27 37:5,18 38:21,24 obtaining 24:24 39:24 40:7,16,18,20,25 **matter** 5:8 9:15 10:6 pages 11:9 22:19 occasion 5:3 23:20 24:17,28 25:5 motions 2:8 7:22 pages' 12:26 26:3 31:6 17:13,16 18:10 19:16, occurred 8:20 paid 10:16 17,20,22 24:17 31:21 matters 10:12,13 11:12 **October** 14:21,25 33:16 35:12,22 36:25 34:11 36:4,16,19 15:10 27:15 39:25 **paper** 11:3 40:20 means 5:25,26 offensive 32:13 papers 7:26 21:20 mouths 6:9 37:23 38:23 meant 11:12 offering 27:1 move 27:3 parallel 14:15 mention 20:27 30:5 office 6:28 moving 21:20 37:23 **pardon** 3:13 7:8 mentioned 30:20 onerous 37:3.6 38:23 part 6:12,18,20,21 7:2, merit 12:22 ongoing 32:28 27 8:7,13 15:22 29:22 Ν merits 2:15 12:5 33:19 online 23:6 38:23,24 Michelle 2:3 22:12,16 opportunity 21:17 participate 9:5 30:22 **named** 9:9 10:9 25:8 27:24 29:10,15 26:21 27:1 30:9 33:10, parties 9:9 20:26 31:7,27 32:5,7 names 25:22 15,17,26 partner 2:5 10:9,10,15 middle 29:5 narrowly 18:6 36:5,9, **oppose** 35:25 11:14 12 mind 36:23 opposed 17:25 partnership 32:20 nature 20:2 **minimal** 11:18 **opposition** 7:26 12:6 **party** 9:10 **Neal** 30:1 32:9 22:23,26 39:23 minute 17:22 22:22 past 13:14 Ninth 35:28 36:11 oral 33:15 minutes 28:5.9 Paulette 4:24 34:5 nonmonetary 10:25 order 10:1,4,21 13:6,17 misappropriate 6:9 18:4 19:11 15:13,15,18,22,26 16:7 pay 32:8 37:4 misconduct 33:1 35:2 17:6 18:20,25 19:7 note 34:7 pending 19:2 20:6,23 21:24 22:2 misinformation 26:5 **notice** 14:7 15:9,14,17 24:3,13 35:4,18 36:3,23 **people** 21:27 34:7 misrepresentations 37:25 38:12 37:20 40:13,14,15,18, **period** 24:19 33:2 21,24

Index: perjured..remainder

preclusive 18:23 perjured 33:1 re-litigating 17:17,28 **prong** 11:5 12:11 17:28 perjury 11:14 12:15 prefiling 36:3 proof 3:7,17,22 11:6 re-published 21:11 22:6 personal 11:28 14:20, prejudgment 7:18 properly 8:4 23 16:11,12,13,23 read 19:4 prejudice 40:10 properties 10:14 18:26 20:28 27:9,19 real 10:2 32:19 39:27 prepare 40:27 property 6:27 10:3 14:20,24 15:16,19,25 reality 5:5 personally 3:8,28 4:1 prepared 31:2 16:11 18:26 27:19,24 27:12 39:25 reason 14:5 26:23 28:15 29:21.25 30:5 present 4:25,28 33:17, persons 24:24 31:8 39:3 reasonable 27:1 persuaded 4:1,2,6 propose 40:8 reasons 23:22 presentation 33:21 PHL 21:21 presented 33:13 37:8 proposed 36:23 40:15 receipts 16:15 photograph 3:15,20 preserve 12:7,10 30:4 protect 19:18 23:21 receive 27:6 pick 28:16 protective 21:24 received 16:4 23:4 presiding 19:5 29:28 **place** 35:4 presuming 23:23 **prove** 3:21 receiving 19:23 provided 15:8 21:12 **plaintiff** 7:22 11:13 pretty 16:1,11,20 39:4 12:14 15:17,19 18:18 recognize 18:9 **prevented** 15:23,27 **public** 13:10,18,22 16:2 36:20 21:26 22:7 recognized 13:27 previous 11:11 **plaintiff's** 16:11 19:19 publication 20:25 recommending 39:6 **prior** 15:4 18:20 19:22 **plaintiffs** 2:4 3:10,19 publish 21:6 21:2 23:13,17 24:2 31:1 reconvey 16:9 **point** 3:28 8:17 10:12, 34:11 35:16,22 published 21:10 22:25 record 9:21 11:17 17 12:23 18:11 32:12, privacy 23:24 13:22 16:2 22:27 28:17 27 33:20 35:15 36:7,17, publishes 23:28 32:6 33:27 35:2 40:14 24 39:16 **privilege** 13:16,25 **pull** 38:28 23:16 32:17,18 records 14:22 16:14 pointing 23:5 purchased 32:9 27:10,11,14,18,27 privileged 13:3,11,20, points 9:8 28:18,20,25 29:19 23 15:2 20:6,14 21:6 purpose 12:24 24:28 **policy** 23:22 32:14,20 recovery 14:19 purposes 11:4 portions 22:26 privileges 23:22 recycling 36:18 put 37:17 **position** 8:11 15:13 pro 2:12 35:24 reduce 5:12,20 10:21 **putting** 37:15 30:19 **problem** 7:12 34:23 reference 27:11 possession 8:21 15:7, Q refused 9:4 15:5 30:22 procedural 11:21 16.18 16:6.8.9.10.22.25 37.9 17:2 20:8,13,17 27:8,12 **Procedure** 6:7 10:24 question 6:4,5 19:1 28:14,22,24,27 29:14, 18:24 refuses 39:3 22 37:20 38:15,19,21 proceed 26:25 35:21 registry 8:26 39:22 R proceeded 14:16 reiterated 2:18 post 7:18 23:2 raised 19:21 29:17 proceeding 9:18,25 related 27:5 30:4 post-judgment 5:17, 11:3 31:6 raising 28:10 related-case 37:16 proceedings 2:1 41:2 posted 23:5 **Rambo** 36:2,13 relates 7:18 29:15 38:8 procured 12:16 posture 11:21 re-consideration relied 10:1 12:26 35:6 prohibit 17:12 20:24 precedent 36:10 relief 12:9 13:9 15:6,23 re-litigate 18:8 19:21 promptly 5:14 preclude 18:7 remainder 8:21,22,25 33:21 34:12 9:6

remark 25:18 responsible 8:6 **rulings** 33:24 **Serve** 32:8 remarks 25:22 30:17 **served** 3:3,8,11,21,28 restates 2:11 **Rutger** 4:25 34:5 4:1,20,28 5:7 7:13,14 **remedies** 17:9,11 restraining 15:22,26 9:3 11:27 27:5 30:10,25 35:17 40:7,11 16.7 S 33:5,6 34:4 39:11,14, remedy 8:12 17:3,24 restraint 21:2 23:13,18 22,25 40:3 safe 23:10 18:6 19:27 20:11 24:1 24:2 **service** 3:8,9,18,22,25 33:23 34:26,28 35:19 sanction 19:11 restraints 35:16 4:2 11:7 30:25 31:3,9 36:24 34:4 39:26,27 sanctionable 13:24 retained 20:10 remember 23:3 37:22 services 24:24 sanctions 2:17 10:23, retrieve 14:23 15:25 removed 22:2 31:26 25 11:1,9,20,22 12:4,22 set 2:9,25 8:3 10:19 return 14:28 15:5 20:6 13:13 14:6 18:2 19:9 renew 34:2,15 36:23 29:24 39:3 21:12 22:5,13,18,21 renewal 2:9,25 6:21 7:5 setting 8:6 23:6 24:22 25:2 31:2,20 returned 38:14 10:20 34:15 35:4 36:6,11 37:18 severe 36:6 returns 10:9.15 16:15 renewed 40:17 **sat** 9:19 **sheriff's** 27:14 29:21 **Revenue** 31:3,9 38:4 renewing 33:28 **Scott** 14:24 15:5 27:6 **revive** 19:13 **showed** 29:16 repeatedly 13:26 **Scribd** 22:19 17:17,28 18:8 19:13,20 revived 7:1 **showing** 35:20 37:13, seal 13:9 22:26 31:15 26:26 revoke 24:3 17,21 32:21 37:11 repeating 36:18 **shows** 39:24 revoked 37:2 sealed 21:8,10 24:10 reply 22:26 31:25 32:7.18 side 26:27 Rice 2:3 6:25 7:24 8:17 represent 34:17 9:2 10:27 11:2 13:7 **sealing** 13:6,17 22:2 signature 11:3 14:10,12 15:12 16:19 request 14:6 15:9,14 seat 2:7 **signed** 40:19 17:4,7,19,23,27 18:16, 17:12 37:25 38:12,22 21 19:8 20:4,9,20 21:3, **secret** 21:27 silently 34:3 requesting 14:27 5,11,20 22:11,12,16,17, secretary 6:28 24,28 23:2,9,15 24:5,8, **single** 13:13 require 17:14 19:4 37:6 11,15,20 25:6,13 27:24 **secreting** 15:23,27 sit 34:3 required 16:9 33:15 28:10 29:10,15 30:11 secrets 21:22 31:7,28 32:2,7,26 34:27 son 4:25 34:5 res 9:19 35:8,14,27 37:12,25 section 6:7 17:21 sort 8:10 9:18 11:27 38:1,3,5,7,11,26 39:12, research 11:18 24:22 12:12 13:15 14:5 15:24 20 40:9,15,22 reservations 35:16 18:6 19:6,12,13,25,27 **seek** 11:1 12:8 13:9,17 Rice's 33:20 24:24,27 35:3 36:2,6, 14:17 15:6 17:14 18:12 residence 15:25 12.21.22 Richard 8:2 resources 19:18 sorts 11:12 23:22 **seeking** 10:25 12:3 **rights** 9:19 respect 7:21,24 10:12 17:10,25 18:2,8 19:13 sought 11:20 14:19 Ringgold 35:28 36:10 26:20 30:19,22,25,27 23:13 36:18 40:11 32:24 37:12 Southern 32:10 **River** 31:12 seeks 19:21 respectful 4:10 speak 21:18 22:4 Robert 2:5 30:2 **seized** 27:11,14,24 respond 19:20 27:25 speaking 32:16 29:21,25,27 room 4:27 34:14 specific 37:24 sense 18:28 21:1 23:27 **rule** 7:6,16 19:9,10 responded 18:9 25:13 specifically 37:2 sentence 29:5 ruled 8:27 9:5 33:18 responding 36:25 34:10,12 specificity 38:17 **separate** 2:8 8:5 14:18 response 26:14 ruling 40:13 **speech** 35:16 September 9:12

spoke 6:28 theories 40:11 trust 7:26 8:8,12 supplemental 38:22 **spot** 31:12 support 12:17 14:6 theory 23:18 turn 20:3 22:13,17 24:10 stage 12:19 thing 4:9 17:9,12 24:3 turned 35:19 **supported** 11:16,24 **standing** 7:25 8:1,5,11 things 23:19 24:1 turnover 15:14,18 9:9,25 10:8 11:19 **suppose** 7:20 17:2 30:20 33:8 37:9 **type** 6:27 9:14 11:12 **starts** 30:15 **supposed** 20:1 24:20 thought 5:13 19:4 19:7 33:7 34:3 37:9 26:19 33:14 state's 6:28 types 36:25 surprise 16:4 throat 30:15 **statements** 16:15 33:1 thwarting 15:24 surrender 20:19 U **status** 21:27 suspended 6:11,23 time 3:27 7:7 12:9 statute 19:3 35:23 underlying 6:13 12:4 10:17,18 34:16,18 19:14,19 24:19,21 30:28 33:18 36:21 **statutory** 18:3 23:26 understand 2:10 3:26 suspension 7:1 5:12,16 10:11,24,28 timely 7:6 stay 18:27 17:9 23:11.12.17 25:27 т **stayed** 18:26 times 4:23 26:19 26:12 28:13 29:2,4 33:7,25 today 23:8 29:1 40:26 **stolen** 11:11 tailored 18:6 20:2 36:5, understanding 2:21 told 39:13 **stop** 16:17 21:15 29:9 10,12 6:26 34:16 30:16 tolerate 25:21 talk 35:21 unfair 34:8 **stopped** 30:14,16 tone 4:12 26:28 talked 17:27 29:10 unprofessional 25:20 strains 40:2 top 6:1 talking 27:27 28:3,8 upheld 25:6 strike 5:12,21 10:21 **totally** 11:25 talks 18:4 Subdivision 7:17 toto 23:6 V tangible 10:3 14:20 **subject** 15:19 23:20 **Touring** 10:4 27:13 **tax** 5:11,14,20 6:12,19 vacate 2:13 11:6 18:10 subjected 13:5 30:6 7:2,18 9:5 10:9,15,21 19:16,17 36:27 39:24 11:10 16:14 17:20 submit 3:20 40:24 tracking 22:4 40:17 30:24 31:5,10 40:16,19 **tracks** 14:15 submitted 3:12,15 valid 4:2 39:9 taxes 10:16 5:15 12:17 21:24 31:4,5 trade 21:22,27 validity 39:18 37:11 39:23 40:15 telling 4:19 28:27 31:24 Traditional 8:23 9:7. vehicle 8:16 submitting 31:1 **temporary** 15:21,26 10,14,17,23,24 10:3,13 16:7 **vexate** 24:25 subsisting 39:9 27:13 30:6 ten 7:10 15:7,20 38:27, vexatious 17:25 18:12 transfer 6:27 10:18 **sued** 30:2 28 19:3,6 35:23 36:2 15:16 sufficient 40:14 terminate 29:17 transferred 8:15,16 view 13:10,19 suggest 36:22 10:14 terminated 14:21 39:2 violated 35:18 suggestion 34:27 transferring 27:16 terminating 2:17 11:9, violater 18:7 summary 9:22 20,22 12:3 13:13 21:12 transfers 10:2 violation 15:26 16:7 23:6 31:2,19 37:18 **summons** 39:15 20:18 37:13 transmitting 31:7 termination 14:26 Superior 17:15 36:4 violence 25:5 trial 33:28 terms 11:19 16:21 28:3 supervising 17:15 tricky 24:2 37:1 38:17 W supplement 37:26 troubled 34:26 testify 4:25 38:12 true 4:20 waited 11:7 testimony 33:16

Page 52 Index: waived..York

waived 11:28

waiver 24:4,16,19,27 25:1,4,17,28 26:9 37:1

waiving 24:13

Wallis 21:21

wanted 26:13,20

web 20:28 22:3

well-tailored 40:8

Westin 8:2 13:28 14:3

whatsoever 30:28

wholly 12:13,18 14:3

witnesses 33:12

worth 12:26

writ 15:7 16:8,10 17:2 20:8,12 27:8,11 28:14, 22,24 29:14,22 30:19 37:20 38:15,19,21 39:22

written 40:13,21,24

wrote 9:4

wwwscribd 22:20

Υ

year 13:8,17 14:25 36:1

years 13:14 15:7,20 30:1 38:27,28 39:2

York 32:11